



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

11 JUL 2017

Mr. Michael Best
MuckRock
DEPT MR 24737
411A Highland Avenue
Somerville, Massachusetts 02144-2516

Dear Mr. Best:

This is in further response to your Freedom of Information Act request of April 1, 2016 to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regarding Covert Action Quarterly and supplements our letter of April 24, 2017.

As noted, coordination with other elements of this command has been completed and the referred records have been returned to this office for final disposition and direct reply to you.

We have conducted a review of the responsive records and as a result of this review, it has been determined that the records no longer warrant security classification protection and are partially releasable to you. A copy of the records are enclosed for your use.

Information has been sanitized from the records as the release of such information could result in the unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned; this information is exempt from public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U. S. Code 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(c).

This withholding of information described above constitutes a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General Christopher S. Ballard, Commander, U. S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority in this matter under the FOIA. You may appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal at this time, your appeal must be postmarked no later than 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 90 day period the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts. You should state the basis for your disagreement with the response and you should provide justification for an additional administrative search to be conducted or reconsideration of the denial. An appeal may not serve as a request for additional or new information. An appeal may only address information denied in this response. Your appeal is to be made to this office to the below listed address for forwarding, as appropriate, to the Secretary of the Army, Office of the General Counsel:

Commander
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
2600 Ernie Pyle Street, Room 3S02-B
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-5910

Additionally, some of the enclosed documents contain deletions made by the FBI. The appropriate exemption appears next to the redacted information. You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D. C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA online portal by creating an account on the following web site: <https://foiaonline.regulations.gov/foia/action/public/home>. Your appeal must be received by OIP within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal". The FBI FOIPA request # 1348075-000 should be cited in any correspondence for proper identification of the request.

Excerpts of information that originated with other government agencies were identified in our file. Therefore, we are referring your request, the excerpts, and this letter to those agencies for necessary action and direct reply to you.

In addition, three pages have been withheld in their entirety. We have provided you with a delete sheet which explains the reason for the withholding and the applicable page numbers.

There are no assessable FOIA fees for the processing of your request.

If you have any questions regarding this action, contact this office at 1-866-548-5651 or email the INSCOM FOIA office at: usarmy.meade.902-mi-grp-mbx.inscom-foia-service-center@mail.mil and refer to case #0588F-17. You now have the ability to check the status of your request online via the U.S. Army Records Management and Declassification Agency website: <https://www.foia.army.mil/FACTS/CaseStatus.aspx>. Please refer to the FOIA Control Number: FP-17-016431. You may also seek dispute resolution services by contacting the INSCOM FOIA Public Liaison, Mrs. Joanne Benear, at 301-677-7856.

Sincerely,



Michael T. Heaton
Director
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure



~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-21-2017 BY J86J43T30 ADG

7 MAY 1979

DAMI-CIC

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosure of Intelligence Report (IR), 2210404479,
dated 30 January 1979 (U)

C.I.A. PUBLICATIONS INC.

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
ATTN: Criminal Investigation Division
9th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
J.E.H. Building
Washington, D.C. 20535

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. (U) Reference is made to FBI letter dated 26 March 1979, ACSI, DA memorandum dated 3 April 1979 and telephone discussions between Mr. Strecker, OACSI, DA and [redacted] FBI.

b6 per FBI
b7C per FBI

2. (U) ~~(C/NORON)~~ At inclosure 1 is a copy of April-May 1979 edition of Covert Action Information Bulletin, published by Covert Actions, Inc., a District of Columbia non-profit corporation. On pages 6, 7, 8 and 9 is the text of a classified Department of the Army (DA) originated IR.

3. (U) In accordance with the reference discussions, this unauthorized disclosure is being referred to the FBI for possible investigation.

4. (U) At inclosure 2, is information concerning the same compromised IR that we provided the Department of State. This information responds to the questions posed in your letter of 26 March 1979 in connection with disclosure of the same IR in the Italian newspaper, La Repubblica on 13 February 1979.

b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

MAY 11 1979

JAMES A. TEAL, JR.
Brigadier General, GS
Deputy ACoS for Intelligence

2 Incl
as
Regraded ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ when
Separated from CLASSIFIED
Inclosures

CLASSIFIED BY: ACSI, DA

CF:
OSD - OGC (b)(7)(C) b6
OSD - CI&IP (b)(7)(C) b6
DLA - RSSI
DA OGC
62 JAN 19 1979
(b)(7)(C) b6

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
7-5-17
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Encl 5, para 1-d, DOD 5200-01-V1

REVIEW ON: 4 May 85

~~SECRET~~

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

Enclosure

cc to DAG (ISS) by 0-6 INFO
COWICE 5/9/79

Number 4 • April-May 1979


ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-21-2017 BY J86J43T30 ADG

\$2.00

Exclusive: CIA IN SPAIN SECRET CABLE
SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT ON AFRICA

Covert Action

INFORMATION BULLETIN



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The CIA Station in Spain Analyzed

Military Intelligence Infiltrates Italy

News Notes

Publications of Interest

Special Africa Supplement:

CIA Foiled at Howard University

Academic Subversives

Book Reviews:

Stockwell and Ignatyev on Angola

Naming Names: Africa

b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

(Incl.) **ENCLOSURE**

EDITORIAL

About This Issue

We are pleased with the *Bulletin's* growing acceptance and use by progressive forces around the world. We will continue to expand the depth and scope of our coverage, and thank our friends and subscribers for their support.

This issue contains a number of significant articles. We publish, for the first time in English, the complete text of a secret U.S. Army Military Intelligence cable sent from Rome to Washington, which resulted in its author's immediate expulsion from Italy in February, when it was first exposed there. The document uncovers MI machinations to infiltrate and control the Italian secret services, even as high as Admirals and Generals, and verifies the substance of Supplement B to Army Field Manual 30-31 published in our last issue, despite the Pentagon's vacuous claim that it was a forgery. We also publish a detailed analysis of the CIA Station in Spain, disclosing a very large, active operation engaged in undercover work in that country during this critical period in its history.

And—a first for the *Bulletin*—we are including a special thematic supplement relating to Africa. This section includes a penetrating interview with a black university professor whom the CIA tried, unsuccessfully, to recruit; and an in-depth examination of dishonest academics and foundations used as cover by intelligence networks to track liberation movements. We also present book reviews about CIA operations in Angola, and have devoted the entire Naming Names section to Africa, exposing more than a dozen Chiefs of Station as well as other high-ranking case and telecommunications officers. We will in the future devote other issues to special themes.

Some Criticisms

Because we are dedicated to the defeat of all the CIA stands for, we applaud every effort in this field. We believe that the more accurate exposures of intelligence operations and personnel which appear, the better. However, we regret errors and inaccuracies by anyone engaged in this work because they undermine the credibility of everyone challenging the intelligence agencies. Our cardinal rule has been to err on the side of caution. With the many hundreds of names which have appeared in the original *CounterSpy*, this *Bulletin*, and *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*, our accuracy in naming CIA officers has never been seriously challenged. (More than 200 names were

deleted from the Appendix to *Dirty Work* because we were not positive they were CIA officers.)

Of course, CIA officers are not the only villains. Many outrages are committed by other government officials, including the police and the military, by multinational corporations, and by petty tyrants around the world. But they should be exposed for what they are, and accurately. A reactionary State Department official may be just as insidious as the CIA officer down the hall in the Embassy, but that does not make him or her a CIA employee. Two recent press releases by the present *CounterSpy* have caused us much concern. One is a list of alleged CIA officers in Mexico, published by at least one Mexican newspaper; the other a similar list on Iran, distributed at press conferences and published in a North American magazine. In our judgment, no more than one name on each list might be a CIA employee, and even those are not definite. They may or may not collaborate with the CIA, but they are not *CIA officers*. We have discussed this with *CounterSpy*, and they intend to publish a clarification. In any case, we urge them to be more meticulous in their research and more precise in their language.

Philip Agee

Another aspect of the present confusion requires a response from us. As we noted in our first issue, three of us, including Philip Agee, were associated with the original *CounterSpy* through its last issue in November 1976. Since that time, none of us has been connected with it, and the persons at present with *CounterSpy* were not on the staff then.

A recent UPI dispatch, widely republished here and abroad, quoted a *CounterSpy* spokesman as stating that it and the *Covert Action Information Bulletin* "share a source in common, Philip Agee." Philip Agee is *not* working with *CounterSpy*, he is *not* a "source" for anyone associated with it, and his *only* institutional association is with this *Bulletin*. *CounterSpy* does not verify its suspicions with this *Bulletin*, nor we with it. We ask that our readers, our contacts, and our friends not confuse us.



Covert Action Information Bulletin, Number 4, April-May 1979, published by Covert Action Publications, Inc., a District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation, P.O. Box 50272, Washington, DC 20004. Telephone (202) 265-3904. All rights reserved; copyright © 1979, by Covert Action Publications, Inc.; permission to reprint will be liberally granted. Typography by *Art for People*, Washington, DC. Original cover graphic by Nuez, Havana. Editorial Board: Philip Agee, Ellen Ray, William H. Schaap, Elsie Wilcott, James Wilcott, Louis Wolf. The *Covert Action Information Bulletin* is available at many bookstores around the world. Write or call for the store nearest you. Inquiries from distributors and subscription services welcomed.

Spying on Your Allies:

Another Embarrassment for American Intelligence

by Philip Agee

It was another embarrassment for American intelligence: headlines all over Italy and widely reported throughout the world. On February 13, 1979 the Italian government expelled an American Embassy official for espionage, the first such expulsion in Italy in living memory.

Such drastic action, taken publicly, is almost unprecedented among NATO allies. It raises many intriguing questions, not least of which is whether the US government is systematically spying on its NATO allies. The case also relates directly to the publication a few months ago of a Top Secret US intelligence document. But to understand the Italian expulsion case, we should first go back to this document.

In September 1978 the Madrid magazine *Triunfo* published a "Top Secret" US Army document entitled Supplement B to Army Field Manual 30-31 (Stability Operations). The document was an instruction on how US military intelligence units operating in "friendly" countries should infiltrate the military and security services of the "friendly" government in order to collect secret information which could be used to provoke the host government into taking a desired course of action. The document also described how to infiltrate insurgent and radical groups in order to stage provocations, with violence if necessary, to bring on repression by host governments against communists and other leftists.

During the months that followed the document appeared in publications throughout most of Western Europe, despite US government efforts to suppress it. In Rome, for example, the US Embassy tried unsuccessfully to stop publication by *L'Europeo* by telling its publisher that making the document public would be "inopportune." In the US the document was published in the January 1979 issue of Covert Action Information Bulletin (CAIB).

Publication by CAIB seems to have prompted the wave of denials that followed. In mid-January unidentified "American officials" told reporters that the Top Secret document was part of a world-wide Soviet KGB disinformation campaign designed to damage US relations with its European and Far Eastern allies. The Pentagon said the document was a forgery. And the Intelligence Committee

of the US House of Representatives said it was investigating this and other forgeries designed to discredit American intelligence activities.

Little did the plot-pushers know that at that very moment in Rome the soup was thickening with a concrete example, soon to boil over, of an American military intelligence operation to penetrate the security apparatus of a NATO ally. Dominic Perrone, an Italian-American whose Italian carried a heavy Brooklyn accent, was the central figure.

Working from his Military Liaison Office in the US Embassy, Perrone was gathering sensitive information from six Italian security and intelligence officials on the inner workings, effectiveness and leadership of the Italian government's anti-terrorism campaign. The information he got was highly sensitive because it consisted of the opinions of his Italian counterparts that the anti-terrorism operations were a shambles, indeed practically hopeless.

This definitely was not the kind of information on Soviet military matters that one would expect Perrone to receive in the normal work of a liaison officer exchanging intelligence with a "friendly" NATO service. In fact, Perrone was infiltrating the Italian security services precisely in the manner prescribed in the "forged" Supplement B.


In late January Perrone wrote a 4000-word report to the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency with copies to other US military intelligence units in Italy and West Germany. Among the recipients in Washington were the CIA, the Department of State, and the National Security Agency.

But in Washington secrets are still kept like weather reports. In early February, just a week after Perrone's report hit analysts' desks there, someone in Washington dropped a copy in the mail to the Rome daily *La Repubblica*. On February 13, following translation and efforts to verify its authenticity, *La Repubblica* published it. The same day the Italian government ordered Perrone to leave the country within 24 hours.

The case made headlines the following day in every Italian paper and was carried by the international wire services

and even reported by the BBC world service. But such is the ephemeral nature of crisis reporting that no full analysis of the report appeared outside Italy. Yet many interesting questions arise from a close reading of the report, a photocopy of which was given to CAIB for review and distribution.

First of all, is the report authentic, or could it be another "KGB forgery"? The US Embassy in Rome, the Department of State in Washington, and the Pentagon all as much as admitted that the report is genuine by refusing to deny its authenticity—in fact they refused all comments because they "never comment on intelligence matters." Then too, Perrone himself could have denied that he wrote the report, but he didn't. Moreover, a review of the report by CAIB staff with intelligence experience led to the conclusion that the report is indeed genuine, particularly because of the very recent date of the information (leaving hardly enough time to concoct a forgery) and the considerable data that could be verified independently.



The Perrone report is a scathing criticism of the Italian government's anti-terrorist operations which are described as "totally ineffective", "in violation of the law", "in chaos", and "led by unqualified persons." While this is the consensus of Perrone's Italian military and carabinieri (national police) sources, he leaves no doubt that the Embassy Military Liaison Office agrees.

The report carries a "2" evaluation of its information content which in US intelligence usage means "probably true", while the sources' credibility evaluation is "B", meaning "usually reliable." Moreover, Perrone emphasizes in a special comment the sensitivity of both the information and the sources' positions. This is the reason Perrone attached to the report, in addition to the "Secret" security classification, the NOFORN sensitivity indicator

which excludes the report from the normal intelligence exchange programs between the US and friendly governments such as the NATO allies. NOFORN means "no foreign dissemination", i.e., the report may be seen by US officials only.

The report is divided into two major sections: first, a discussion of the workings of the Italian intelligence and security services, and secondly, descriptions of the personalities and work habits of the three carabinieri generals in charge of anti-terrorist operations.

Perrone's central theme is the failure of Major General Giulio Grassini to set up effectively the new anti-terrorist agency established in late 1977 by the Italian parliament. This organization, the Intelligence and Democratic Security Service (SISDE—Servizio Per Le Informazioni E Per La Sicurezza Democratica) was to have centralized in one agency all the anti-terrorist operations then conducted by the various military and police services.

However, according to a report prepared in December 1978 for Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti by his Executive Committee for Intelligence and Security Services, SISDE at the end of its first year of operations was "not functioning according to the law; had not been carrying out its assigned mission; had not been able to develop a viable structure and was still in the process of organizing; was being led by unqualified persons who ignored the professionally qualified personnel" and "had to be considered almost totally ineffective."

Partly as a result of SISDE's failure and partly as a cause, according to the Perrone report, the Italian Intelligence and Military Security Service (SISMI—Servizio Per Le Informazioni E Per La Sicurezza Militare) was carrying on illegal anti-terrorist operations to the grave detriment of its proper military counter-espionage mission. According to one of Perrone's sources, "SISMI's counterespionage and other missions were now almost non-existent because of a lack of qualified personnel and of the diversion of SISMI resources to anti-terrorism." In other words SISMI was leaving the field open for agents from communist countries assigned to spy against NATO facilities in Italy.


Again on SISDE, one of Perrone's sources observed, "The only agency assigned the anti-terrorist function by law was SISDE which probably was conducting the least amount of actual anti-terrorist activity." Although Perrone's sources admit valid reasons for Major General Grassini's failure, Perrone himself observes that "no optimistic opinions of the present status and future of SISDE was (sic) heard."

But the reason was not only General Grassini's failure. Another carabinieri general, Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, was crossing from one agency to another imposing requirements and assigning tasks as the Prime Minister's Coordinator for Anti-Terrorism and the Investigation of the Aldo Moro Murder. Major General Dalla Chiesa was also in charge of the special prisons for terrorists.

According to one of Perrone's sources, Dalla Chiesa had the habit of "appearing at raids and other publicity valuable scenes" and "taking credit for what other agencies had done." Another source reported Dalla Chiesa as "action-oriented and interested in obtaining results" without much concern about methods. "The fine points of illegality or legality of this action would not interest him and he would be inclined to take action first and let someone else worry about whether the action was completely legal or not." The same source described Dalla Chiesa as "intelligent" but "not an intellectual", "inclined to be a little ruthless" and "a highly visible person who would also seek public recognition for his efforts . . ."

The third carabinieri general criticized in the Perrone report is Major General Arnaldo Ferrara, former Vice-Commander of the Carabinieri Corps and now the Italian President's Consultant for Anti-Terrorism and Law and Order. Two of Perrone's sources described Ferrara as "very ambitious" and hoping to be the first non-military officer to be appointed Chief of the Carabinieri Corps. One source said Ferrara possibly had accepted the appointment as Presidential Consultant "to keep himself in the limelight and to use the position to obtain future responsible assignments," while another source said Ferrara "probably would use his present position as a stepping stone."

One has to ask the question, on reading such heavy criticism of the Italian security services and their leaders, whether Perrone's sources might be biased through professional jealousies, embittered by failures, or simply incompetent themselves. Perhaps Perrone gave them too much credibility in assigning the "probably true" and "usually reliable" indicators. It could be, except that US intelligence practice reserves assigning "usually reliable" to a source (in this case all six sources have this rating) until the source has been tested over a period of six months to a year. (The rating is on a scale from "A" meaning "always reliable" to "F" meaning "reliability cannot be judged.")



In any case Perrone describes the sources as officers of the military intelligence service (SISMI) and the Carabinieri Corps from junior grade to General or Admiral rank, working in different positions that involve "close contacts

with Major General Grassini and SISDE." The sources also have had "close relationships with Dalla Chiesa and Ferrara. It seems they ought to know."

The report reveals that the Military Liaison Office in Rome has used these or other sources for similar reporting in the past and here we come again to the supposedly forged US Army intelligence manual. Perrone notes in his opening summary that the report corresponds to the information requirements of six paragraphs of a directive issued for intelligence collection. Clearly US military intelligence has imposed a continuing requirement for the Embassy's Military Liaison Office to obtain the kind of information contained in Perrone's report. In fact, Perrone also wrote that this report "complements and updates information contained in (three other intelligence reports filed in 1978)."

Is this a classic spy operation with Perrone paying money to his sources and cloaking the operation with all the paraphernalia of clandestine operations? Probably not, although the heading of the report contains a "Project Number" which in the CIA's practice is usually an accounting device for control of funds. More likely, Perrone came to know his sources through normal liaison contact for exchange of intelligence on NATO's adversaries, gradually obtained their confidence, and eventually coaxed them through skillful elicitation into revealing sensitive information on their own services that ought to be kept "in the family."

In any case the CIA's practice throughout the world, and one would expect the military to operate in the same way, is to use "service-to-service" official liaison contacts as an avenue to penetrate the "sister" services. The goal is to protect the CIA's unilateral operations (i.e., activities unknown by the host government or services) from discovery and penetration, to have other services perform services for the CIA, such as telephone tapping, and to monitor the capabilities and morale of the local services. Whether or not the Top Secret US Army intelligence manual is a forgery, the Perrone Report shows that US military intelligence is operating in keeping with the manual's instructions, and without doubt its operations are consistent with the CIA's practices.

Finally, one cannot overlook the question of why this secret report was given to *La Repubblica*. One can imagine Perrone's shock, along with that of others in the US Embassy in Rome, to discover that it took just two weeks for the report to go from his desk in the Embassy to Washington for distribution and then back to Rome for the newspapers.


To answer why the document was leaked, one must ask what result publication will most likely have. No doubt relations between American and Italian services will be strained. In other countries "sister" services of the CIA and US military intelligence services will have still another reason to withhold or reduce liaison and collaboration with the American services. For some five years successive Directors of the CIA have complained of this problem in denouncing leaks and revelations from Congressional investigations.

The Perrone report also had repercussions in Italian politics. Both Communists and Christian Democrats denounced Perrone's activities, and the case surely would aggravate acting Prime Minister Andreotti's difficulties in forming a new government with the Communist Party—which has already begun to agitate for a new investigation into the government's handling of the Moro investigation. Such prejudice to the U.S.'s main political allies in Italy (whom the CIA financed with tens of millions of dollars since World War II) would seem to rule out the possibility that the report was leaked intentionally in order to spur the anti-terrorist campaign to greater effectiveness.

In the end, dissension in Washington may be the most plausible explanation for the leak. The case could only add embarrassment and discredit to the increasingly shaky position of Stansfield Turner, the CIA Director, who in the end must assume responsibility for the Perrone "flap." For he is responsible for *all* American intelligence services, including the military, not just for the CIA.

As in the case of President Carter's recent hand-written criticism of the CIA's intelligence failures in evaluating the Shah's stability in Iran, which was probably leaked by a high CIA official seeking to undermine Turner, the Perrone report would have a similar effect in Washington. Turner seems to have created so much dissension within the American intelligence community that his own people seek ways to embarrass him and force his resignation.

Whatever the truth behind this affair may be, one result is certain. Dominic Perrone, who promised in his report to send a separate report on the internal structure of SISDE,



will file no more reports from Rome. And his Italian sources are unlikely to continue exposing their dirty laundry for their NATO "ally."

Referred

Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act
Deleted Page(s) Information Sheet

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐ Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐ Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒ Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐ Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of the information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

☐ Other:

DELETED PAGE(S) NO DUPLICATION FEE FOR THIS PAGE.

Page(s) 8-10

CONFIDENTIAL

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on

7-5-17

by USAINSCOM FOI/PA

Auth Encl 5, para 1-d, DOD 5200-01-V1

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-21-2017 BY J86J43T30 ADG

26 APR 1979

DAMI-CIC

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosure of IR 2 210 4044 79, dated 30 January 1979 (U)

Mr. Verne F. St. Mars
Acting Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Security
Office of Security
US Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

1. (U) Reference is made to the discussions between (b)(7)(C) b6 of this office and you on 24 and 25 April 1979 concerning a possible FBI investigation of subject unauthorized disclosure and the Department of Justice letter to the DOD General Counsel regarding such investigation.

2. (U)(C) To assist the Department of State in requesting a FBI investigation of subject compromise, set below are answers to the eleven questions the FBI posed to OACSI, DA, concerning the compromised document:

a. (U)(C) The data and identity of the article disclosing the classified information. The report was dated January 30, 1979, and entitled "I&SS - Status of SIDE/SISMI Anti-Terrorist Orientation." The originator of the document was (b)(7)(C) b6 USAREUR, Rome Liaison Officer to the Italian intelligence and security services.

b. (U) Specific statements in the article which are considered classified and whether the data was properly classified. That part of the article that was a copy of the subject IR was classified and had been properly so identified.

c. (U)(C) Whether the classified data disclosed is accurate? Data disclosed was accurate in the best judgment of the reporting officer, based on his professional experience and knowledge of the Italian intelligence and security system.

d. (U) Whether the data came from a specific document and, if so, the origin of the document and the name of the individual responsible

CLASSIFIED BY: ACSI DA

REVIEW ON: 26 Apr 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

b3 per FBI
b7E per FBI

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DAMI-CIC

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosure of IR 2 210 4044 79, dated 30 January 1979 (U)

for the security of the classified data disclosed? The compromised data was contained in an electrically transmitted IR to multiple addressees. All authorized recipients of the IR are responsible for its security.

e. (U) The extent of official dissemination of the data?
Official dissemination of the data was to:

Washington D.C.

Commandant Marine Corps
Chief of Staff Air Force
Chief Naval Operations
Secretary of State
National Security Agency
Defense Intelligence Agency
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Germany

Commander-In-Chief, US European Command, Vaihingen
Commander-In-Chief, US Army Europe, Heidelberg
66th Military Intelligence Group, Munich

Italy

Commander, Det D, 66th MIG, Vicenza
Navy Intelligence Service Attache, Naples
Air Force Office of Security & Intelligence, Aviano AB
US Defense Attache Office, Rome
Air Force Office of Security & Intelligence Det, Rome
BEN, Rome (NFI)

f. (U) Whether the data has been the subject of prior official releases? No.

g. (U) Whether prior clearance for publication or release of the information was sought from proper authorities? No.

h. (U) Whether the material or portions thereof or enough background data has been published officially or in the press to make an educated speculation on the matter possible? No.

i. (U) (C) Whether the data can be declassified for the purpose of prosecution and, if so, the name of the person competent to testify concerning the classification? Since the compromised report was given wide press dissemination in Italy and was recently published

²
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

26 APR 1979

DAMI-CIC

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosure of IR 2 210 4044 79, dated 30 January 1979 (U)

in a US journal, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes declassification is possible for purpose of prosecution, and the security interests of the United States, by court disclosure outweighs possible damage to national security by this further disclosure. Mr. Henry A. Strecker, Deputy Chief, Directorate of Counterintelligence, OACSI, is the individual competent to testify concerning the classification.

1. (U) Whether declassification had been decided upon prior to the publication or release of the data? Yes, however, declassification would not have occurred until 31 Dec 1998.

Referred

3. (U) If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please feel free to contact us.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

signed COL J. D. FINK

JERRY D. FINK
Colonel, GS
Director of Counterintelligence

CF:

OSDGC, ATTN:

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